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It is proposed in this paper to trace the development of the
law on the subject of the right of contribution between joint
tortfeasors. The question has assumed increased importance
since the activities and relations of persons engaged in industry
has taken on a most complex nature. The writer will confine
himself to the discussion of the rules governing contribution and
will, therefore, not take up those cases which have to do with
the right of indemnity that may or may not exist where the
relation between the litigants is that of principal and agent or
master and servant and where as between the tortfeasors, one
is primarily responsible for the wrong and ought to bear the
consequences. It has long been a familiar maxim that there can
be no contribution among wrongdoers. This doctrine, that one
joint tortfeasor who pays or is compelled to pay all the damages,
cannot obtain contribution from those who are equally guilty
as himself, or even more guilty than he, had its origin in the
case of Merryweather v. Nixon.1 This is a necessary conse-
quence of the principle embodied in the maxim ex turpi causa
non oritur actio.2 An analysis of this case, however, will dis-
close that one S had previously brought an action on the case
against the present plaintiff and defendant for an injury done
by them to his reversionary estate in a will, in which was in-
cluded a count in trover for the machinery, had recovered judg-
ment and had collected the whole amount thereof from the
present plaintiff, who thereupon brought this action for con-
tribution. Lord Kenyon held that the plaintiff was properly
non-suited, merely remarking that "he had never before heard
of such an action having been brought where the former recov-
ery was for a tort." Lord Kenyon further said "this decision
would not affect cases of indemnity where one man employed
another to do acts, not unlawful in themselves, for the purpose
* Of the Pennsylvania Bar.
8 T. L. R. 186 (1799).
2 Street's Foundation of Legal Liability, vol. 1, P. 490, and Harper on
Torts, Section 333.
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of asserting a right." It is therefore necessary in any intelli-
gent discussion of the doctrine of no contribution between joint
tortfeasors to keep in mind that the doctrine enunciated by the
court in Merryweather v. Nixon 3 had reference to a case where
there was an intentional wrong done to the plaintiff by the joint
defendants. Best, C. J., in Adamson v. Jarvis 4 says "From the
concluding part of Lord Kenyon's judgment in Merryweather v.
Nixon, and from reason, justice and sound policy, the rule that
wrongdoers cannot have redress or contribution against each
other is confined to cases where the person seeking redress must
be presumed to have known that he was doing an unlawful act."
In the case of Palmer v. Wick & Sulteneytown Steam Shipping
Co.5 one Palmer, a stevedore, was engaged in discharging pig
iron from the shipping company's vessel when one of his work-
men was killed by the fall of a defective block, part of the ship's
tackle. A joint judgment against Palmer and the company
was paid in full by the latter, which then brought this action
for contribution. Held, the defendant Palmer was liable in this
action for contribution, and the court, through Lord Herschell
quotes Best, C. J., in Adamson v. Jarvis. 6 Thus we see that the
House of Lords permits contribution between negligent tort-
feasors at least in negligence cases arising in Scotland.7
The common law is well settled that there can be no contribu-
tion between tortfeasors who knew and intended the tortious
consequences of their misconduct.8 It has never been suggested
that this rule should be changed to allow contribution between
the intentional wrongdoers. Green, J., in the case of Thuratt v.
Jones9 said, "The reason why the law refuses its aid to enforce
contribution amongst wrongdoers, that they may be intimidated
3 Supra note 1.
4 4 Bing. 66 (1827).
5 1894 A. C. 318.
6 Supra note 4.
7 See R. A. Seplar, "Contribution and Indemnity Between Tort Feasors,"
(1933) 81 Pa. L. Rev.
8 Merryweather v. Nixon, supra note 1, Weld-Blundell v. Stephens 1920
A. C. 956; Rucker v. Allendorph, 102 Kan. 771; Alexander v. Alexander,
154 Ky. 324; Peck v. Ellis, 2 Johns. Ch. 131 (N. Y. 1816), 2 Summer (U. S.)
238 (Arnold v. Clifford); Miller v. Fenton, 11 Paige (N. Y.) 18, 3 Head.
121 (Tenn.); Atkins v. Johnson, 43 Vt. 78; Davis v. Gilham, 44 Ohio St.
69, Boyer v. Bolender, 129 Pa. 324. For additional cases, see T. W. Reath
"Contribution Between Persons." 12 Harv. L. R. 176. Also see for more
cases, Woodward "Quasi Contracts," P. 402 n. 3; Harper on Torts, Section
333.
9 1 Randolph 328 (Va. 1823).
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from committing the wrong, by the danger of each being made
responsible for all the consequences; a reason which does not
apply to torts or injuries arising from mistakes or accidents or
involuntary omissions in the discharge of official duties." In
an action for contribution by one joint wrongdoer against an-
other, the test of recovery is said to be whether the plaintiff,
at the time of the commission of the act for which he has been
compelled to respond, knew that such act was wrongful. 10 In
Bailey v. Bussing,1 the owner of a coach, after being charged
for the negligence of the driver, sued him for contribution, and
it was held he could recover, Ellsworth, J., said: "The reason as-
signed in the books for denying contribution among trespassers
is that no right of action can be based on a violation of law; that
is, where the act is known to be such, or is apparently of that
character. A guilty trespasser, it is said, cannot be allowed to
appeal to the law for an indemnity, for he has placed himself
without its pale by contemning it, and must ask in vain for its
interposition in his behalf. If, however, he was innocent of an
illegal purpose, ignorant of the nature of the act, which was ap-
parently correct and proper, the rule will change with its reason,
and he may then have an indemnity, or, as the case may be, a
contribution-as a servant yielding obedience to the command
of his master, or an agent to his principal, in what appears to
be right; an assistant rendering aid to a sheriff in the execu-
tion of process; or common carrier, to whom is committed, and
who innocently carry away, property which has been stolen from
the owner. The form of action, then, is not the criterion. We
must look further. We must look for personal participation,
personal culpability, personal knowledge. If we do not find
these circumstances, but perceive only a liability in the eye of
the law, growing out of a mere relation to the prepetrator of
the wrong, the maxim of law that there is no contribution
among wrongdoers is not to be applied. Indeed, we think this
maxim too much broken in upon this day to be called with pro-
priety a rule of law, so many are the exceptions to it, as in the
cases of master and servant, principal and agent, partners, joint
operators, carriers, and the like."
It should further be borne in mind that what is unhappily
generally regarded as the general rule of no contribution be-
10 Torpy v. Johnson, 43 Neb. 882, 62 N. W. 253.
11 28 Conn. 455 (1859), Reath "Contribution Between Persons," 12 Harv.
L. R. 186.
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tween joint tortfeasors as announced in Merryweather v. Nixon
is really an exception rather than a rule. The general rule of
law is that, "Where two or more persons are jointly or jointly
and severally bound to pay a sum of money and one or more of
them are compelled to pay the whole or more than his or their
share, those paying may recover from those not paying the ali-
quot proportion which they ought to pay."'12  It is submitted
therefore, that it would be more proper to state that there can
as a general rule be contribution among wrongdoers excepting
those cases in which the wrongdoers are morally guilty. It
would unquestionably lead to less confusion so to state the gen-
eral rule.
Thus far we have observed how the rule of no contribution
between joint tortfeasor had its origin in a case in which there
were intentional wrongdoers; it is further noted that the com-
mon law is well settled in all jurisdictions that there can be no
contribution between intentional or wilful tortfeasors; and that
such a rule is a most salutary one cannot be controverted. The
writer, in discussing the question whether contribution should
be enforced between Wrongdoers whose liability arose out of
mere negligence, will endeavor to show that the reason for the
rule of no contribution between intentional joint tortfeasors is
absent when the application of the doctrine is sought to be made
in respect to non-intentional or negligent wrongdoers.
There is a line of cases which permit contribution between
the joint tortfeasors who are legally responsible for the wrong
not because they actually participated in the commission but
because of their relation to the actual wrongdoer, that is where
the element of vicarious responsibility is present. 14 (The varia-
tions of this type of case will be discussed later.) Contribution
is also allowed "when the parties authorized or actually par-
ticipated in such an infringement of another's legal rights as
constitute a tort, but they acted in good faith and are not
chargeable with knowledge that their action was wrongful."'15
127 Americ. Eng. Enc. of Law (2d Ed.) 326, Woodward "Quasi Con-
tracts" (1913), P. 401.
13 "Quasi Contracts" (1913), P. 403.
14 Wooley v. Batte, 1826, 2 Cas. P. 417, Bailey v. Bussing, 28 Conn.
455; Ankeny v. Moffett, 37 Minn. 109; Horbach v. Elder, 18 Pa. St. 33;
Hobbs v. Hurley 117 Me. 449.
15 Vandever v. Pollak, 1893, 97 Ala. 467 (levy on goods); Farwell v.
Becker, 129 Ill. 261 21 N. E. 792 (1889) (Attachment of goods);
Jacobs v. Pollard, 10 Cush. (Mass.) 287 (seizure of cattle by plaintiff and
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While it is not the purpose of the writer to discuss at length
those cases in which indemnity is allowed, it may be well to men-
tion here that even in those jurisdictions which do not permit
contribution between tortfeasors-joint and negligent-the
courts will allow indemnity whenever one has paid the damages
which ought to have been paid by another upon whom rested the
basic or primary responsibility, but which damages have been
paid by that other because of some rule of law which holds
either of them or both to the person injured.1 In the case of
Lowell v. Boston L. R. R.17 the court says, "Our law however,
does not in every case disallow an action by one wrongdoer
against another to recover damages incurred in consequence of
their joint offense. * * * If the parties are not equally crim-
inal, the principal delinquent may be held responsible to his co-
delinquent for damages incurred by their joint offense. In
respect to offenses in which is involved any moral delinquency
or turpitude all parties are deemed equally guilty and courts
will not inquire into their relative guilt. But where the offense
is merely malum prohibitum, and in no respect immoral, it is not
against the policy of the law to inquire into the relative delin-
quency of the parties, and to administer justice between them,
although both parties are wrongdoers." In the light of these
cases and those which arise by reason of the various legal rela-
tions, such as master and servant, principal and agent, common
carriers, joint contractors and partners, the doctrine of "no con-
tribution" does not apply. It is apparent that there is justifi-
cation for Ellsworth, J.'s, statement in Bailey v. Bussing,'8 "we
think this maxim too much broken in upon at this day to be
called with propriety a rule of law, so many are the exceptions
to it, as in the case of master and servant, principal and agent,
partners, carriers and the like."
What then is the law in regard to contribution between joint
tortfeasors whose liability arose out of mere negligence? The
sale by defendant); Smith v. Ayrault, 1888, 71 Mich. 475 (infringement of
patent); Schappel v. First Nat. Bank, 80 Neb. 708 (attachment); Acheson
v. Miller, 1853, 20 Mo. St. 203 (levy on goods).
16 Lowell v. Boston L. RR 23 Pick. (Mass.) 32; Gray v. Boston Light
Co., 114 Mass. 149; Washington Gaslight Co. v. Do C, 161 U. S. 316; Cin-
cinnati R. Co. La. R. Co., 97 Ky. 128; Austin, etc., Ry. Co. v. Faust, 133
S. W. (Tex.) 449; Portland v. Citizens Tel. Co., 206 Mich. 632; Oceanic
Co. v. Compania Transatlantica, 134 N. Y. 461.
17 Supra note 16.
18 Supra note 11.
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courts are not in accord in the answer they give to this question.
The heavy weight of authority is today in favor of the doctrine
that denies any right to contribution. 19 Some of the states
whose common law rule denied contribution have abrogated in
whole or in part such doctrine, by the enactment of statutes.20
The unfortunate feature of most of these statutes is that they
are burdened with unnecessary limitations and significant de-
fects which render them impotent to effect what must have been
the design of the legislators in passing them, viz., to abrogate,
in toto, the common law rule in their respective jurisdiction,
that there can be no contribution among joint wrongdoers whose
liability arose through negligence. Most of these statutes per-
mit contribution only between tortfeasors against whom joint
judgment has been rendered. A statute providing simply that
"there shall be contribution among tortfeasors" eliminates this
difficulty.21 Others fail to provide a method whereby a defend-
ant may interplead his fellow wrongdoer when he is within
reach of process. 22 Thus, in construing the New York statute,
the Court said in Fox v. Western, etc., Lines, 23 "Section 211-a
has in no way modified or extended Section 19324 subdivision 2,
of the Civil Practice Act, or the limitations placed upon it by
the courts. The practice under the latter section is the same
19 Union Stock Yards Co. v. Chicago etc. R. Co., 196 U. S. 217 (1905);
Atlantic etc. R. Co. v. Southern, etc., Co., 107 Fed. 874; Forsythe v. Los
Angeles R. Co., 149 Cal. 569; Gregg v. Page Belting Co., 69 N. H. 247;
Andrews v. Murray, 33 Barb. (N. Y.) 354; Galveston, etc., R. Co. v.
Mass., 94 Tex. 255; Walton v. Miller, 109 Va. 210; Tacoma v. Bonnell, 65
Wash. 505; Doles v. Seaboard, etc., R. Co., 16 N. C. 318; Wise v. Berger,
Ill. Cent. Ry. Co. v. Bridge Co., 171 Ky. 444; Cain v. Quannale Light, Ice
Co., 131 Old. 25; Gulf S. L R. R. Co. v. Gulf Ref. Co., 260 Fed. 262; Central
of Ga. Ry. Co. v. Swift Co., 23 Ga. App. 346; Larkin v. Terminal Ware-
house Co., 146 N. Y. Supp. 380; Spalding v. Adm. of Oakes, 42 Vt. 20;
Public Service Ry. v. Mattenci, 105 N. J. L. 114; Royal Indemnity Co. v.
Becker, 122 Ohio St. 582. See Harper, Law of Tort, Section 333.
20 Georgia, Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, Missouri, New Mexico, New
York, North Carolina, Texas, Virginia, West Virginia.
21 Such statutes are in force in Ky. Stat. (Carroll, 1930) 484a; Va.
Code Ann. (Michie 1930), i. 5779.
22 See 45 Harv. L. R. 369 at 373.
23 257 N. Y. 305, 178 N. E. 289.
24 "Where any party to an action shows that some third person, not then
a party to the action, is or will be liable to such party wholly or in part
for the claim made against such party in the action, the court, on applica-
tion of such party, may order such person to be brought in as a party to
the action."
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now as it has been since 1923. Sec. 211-a sought to remedy
one glaring defect in the law. Where a judgment had been
recovered against two joint tortfeasors, the payment by
one relieved the other of all liability, either to the plaintiff or
to the paying defendant. This was changed by requiring the
joint defendant to pay his share of the judgment. This is the
only change that has been made. A plaintiff may now sue as
many defendants as he pleases whom he thinks may be liable in
negligence for his damages. The legislature has not given this
same choice to the defendants to bring in other parties, whom
they think should be liable either in place of or jointly with
those whom the plaintiff has selected. If Section 193 is to be
extended, it must be by the act of the Legislature and not by the
fiat of the courts. ' 25 The North Carolina Act 26 meets these diffi-
culties by giving a defendant an election either to sue his joint
tortfeasors separately or to implead them in the initial cause.
The doctrine that there may be contribution between unin-
tentional joint tortfeasors has been adopted as the common law
rule only in three states-Wisconsin, 27 Pennsylvania 28 and Min-
nesota.
29
It is interesting that an exhaustive search has revealed but
three cases 3o in which there were vehicles owned and operated
respectively by A and B which collided by reason of their con-
current negligence, and the rule that there may be contribution
between negligent joint tortfeasors has been applied. It has
been suggested31 that the leading case on this subject in Penn-
syvania, Goldman v. Mitchell-Fletcher Co.,32 permits contribu-
tion because of the technical nature of the liability of the wrong-
doers, and not because of the character of the wrong committed.
25 See 9 N. Y. L. Q 354.
26 N. C. Pub. Laws (1929), c. 68, 1 Amend. N. C. Com. Stat. (1919),
618 N. C. Code Am. (Michie 1931), S. 618.
27 Ellis v. Chicago, N. W. R. Co., 167 Wis. 392; Mitchell v. Raymond,
181 Wis. 591; Sattler v. Neiderkom, 190 Wis. 464; Wait v. Pierce, 191 Wis.
202; Rober v. Lowell, 200 Wis. 420; Hainer v. Duffy, 206 Wis. 193.
28 Armstrong County v. Clarion Co., 66 Pa. 218; Goldman v. Mitchell-
Fletcher Co., 292 Pa. 354.
29 Underwriters at Lloyds, etc., v. Smith, 166 Minn. 388 (1926); Dulty
M. N. Ry. Co. v. McCarthy, 183 Minn. 414.
30 Mitchell v. Raymond, 181 Wis. 591; Sattler v. Neiderkom, 190 Wis.
464; Underwriters, etc., v. Smith, 166 Minn. 388.
31 34 Dick. L. R. 123 at 128.
3 2 Supra note 28.
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In that case one Gertrude Goldman, a minor, through her
mother, S. Goldman, and the latter in her own right, sued to
recover for injuries sustained by the former while a passenger
on a trolley owned and operated by one of the two joint defend-
ants, the Phila. Rapid Transit Co., which collided with a wagon
and team of horses owned by and under the control of an em-
ployee of the other defendant, Mitchell-Fletcher Co. Verdicts
were rendered and judgments entered for both plaintiffs and
against both defendants. The American Surety Co., surety for
Mitchell-Fletcher Co., paid the judgments to the plaintiffs and
was subsequently permitted by order of the trial court to inter-
vene to assert its right to subrogation and to mark the judg-
ments to its use. The court to avoid further litigation passed
on the question of the right to contribution (the only question
really involved was the right of the Surety Co. to be subrogated
to the judgments). The court held that the rule that there can
be no contribution between joint tort feasors applied only where
there has been an intentional wrong or violation of law, or
where the wrongdoer knows or is presumed to know that the
act was unlawful. It expressly held that the rule does not apply
to torts which are the result of mere negligence. It is argued
that the case of Goldman v. Mitchell-Fletcher Co. may take its
place among those which permit contribution because the par-
ties are legally responsible for a wrong, not because they auth-
orized or actually participated in its commission, but because of
their relation to the actual wrongdoer. But the court, after a
most exhaustive review of the English and American authori-
ties, states in no uncertain terms that the rule of no contribution
between joint tortfeasors has no application to torts which are
the result of mere negligence. It seems clear, therefore, that
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court will not hesitate to hold that
contribution may be permitted between negligent joint tort-
feasors where the liability of the defendants is not by implica-
tion of law but because of active participation, and where, as in
Mitchell v. Raymond, 33 contribution must rest on the theory that
no wilful tort was committed. The whole idea in denying con-
tribution between intentional or wilful tort feasors is primitive
in outlook-it is to impose a penalty upon those who deliberately
flout the very law through whose medium they now seek relief,
and so that, perhaps, too, future wrongdoers may be intimidated
from committing the wrong. 34
33 Supra note 30.
34 Supra note 9.
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A study of the cases in which the liability of the negligent
joint tortfeasors grows out of the rule respondent superior dis-
closes that contribution is generally permitted where the lia-
bility of the parties arises out of the misconduct of their joint
employee.3 5 On the other hand, contribution is not allowed in
many cases in which there are wholly unconnected principals,
but they are rendered jointly liable -for injuries occasioned by
the concurrent but not concerted acts of their respective
agents.3 6 It would seem that there is no distinction between
these two types of 'respondeat superior' cases and the same re-
sults should be reached in both classes. The reason for denying
contribution between intentional wrongdoers is equally absent
here as in the former type of case. In Public Service Rwy. Co.
v. Mattencci, 37 on facts precisely analogous to Goldman v.
Mitchell-Fletcher Co. contribution was denied, the court say-
ing, "Whenever the damage is the product of the contributory
misfeasances the action will lie against each of the wrongdoers
or against both, and neither one can claim contribution from
the other so as to dispense the loss equally among themselves,
the reason being that the law will not undertake to adjust the
burden of misconduct." The writer has found no jurisdiction
which permits contribution where a joint servant has com-
mitted the tort and denies it where two independent employees
of respective principals concurrently commit the tort.
There remains to discuss the nature of the tort feasor's right
to contribution. In so far as the right of a tort feasor to in-
demnify or contribution has been recognized, it is enforced both
in equity and at law. Where the wrong consists of a mere un-
intentional neglect of duty, it cannot properly be said that there
is an implication of a promise of contribution. "The obligation
may well be rested upon quasi-contractual principles, for inso-
far as one tortfeasor pays what is equity and good conscience
another tortfeasor ought to pay, the latter receives a benefit
at the expense of the former, the retention of which is un-
35 Wooley v. Batte, 2 C. P 417 (1826); Farney v. Hauser, 109 Man. 75
(1921); Hobbs v. Husky, 117 Me. 449; Ankenny v. Moffett, 37 Minn. 109,
Horback's Adm. v. Elder, 18 Pa. 33 (1851); Also see, Woodward "Quasi
Contracts," P 403 (1913).
36 Union Stock Yards etc. v. Chicago B. Q. R. R. 196 N. S. 217 (1905);
Central of Ga. Ry. Co. v. Macon Ry. Co., 9 Ga. App. 628; Illinois C. RR
Co. v. Louisville Bridge Co., 171 Ky. 445; Detroit Ry. Co. v. Boomer, 194
Mich 52; Public Service Ry. Co. v. Mattenci, 105 N. J. L. 114. See Leflar,
"Contribution and Indemnity Between Tort Feasors," 81 Pa. L. R. 143.
37 105 N. J. L. 114 (1928).
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just."38 "The doctrine of contribution is not founded on con-
tract but comes from the application of principles of equity to
the condition in which the parties are found in consequence of
some of them, as between themselves, having done more than
their share in the performance of a common obligation. ' 30
An exhaustive search of the Indiana Reports revealed to the
writer that the question of the right to contribution between
joint tortfeasors has arisen in the appellate courts in only two
cases. In The American Express Co. v. Patterson 40 where an
action was brought against an express company and another to
recover damages for arrest and imprisonment, it was held that
the fact that the verdict is silent as to one of the defendants is
no cause for a venire de novo-the court saying "* * * but,
whether the judgment be joint or several, there is no right of
contribution which can be enforced as between the defend-
ants." In Smith v. Graves 41 there was a suit by one Graves
against Smith, Bowser and Kocher to recover damages for
alleged malicious prosecution. The jury found for the plaintiff
against the defendants Smith and Bowser and was silent as to
the third. It was held that in view of the nature of their lia-
bility, none of the defendants affected by the verdict can com-
plain that it was not also against their codefendant and that
the rule in actions on contract, that a verdict against part of
the defendants without a finding either for or against the other
is a nullity, does not apply. The court says, "The liability of
the appellants as tortfeasors is several and the suit may be
maintained against all, or one, or any number of them. There
is no right of contribution that can be enforced as between such
defendants or persons liable for the same tort."
Thus, we see that in the two cases in which the right to con-
tribution has been passed on, the courts have in neither case at-
tempted to distinguish between a delict proper or a quasi-delict,
i. e. whether contribution might be permissible if the tortfeasors
involved are negligent and be refused where the tort is an inten-
tional one. Perhaps it can be said that the right to contribu-
tion between joint negligent wrongdoers is open in Indiana, and
that if the question is squarely presented the court may formu-
late a rule allowing contribution under such circumstances.
S Woodward, Quasi Contracts, 409.
39 13 C. J. 821.
40 73 Ind. 437 (1881).
41 59 Ind. App. 55 (1914).
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
Published Monthly, October to June, inclusive, by The Indiana State Bar
Association
EXECUTIVE OFFICE, S17 UNION TITLE BUILDING,
INDIANAPOLIS, INDIANA
EDITORIAL OFFICE, BLOONINGTON, INDIANA
SUBSCRIPTION PRICE, $3.00 A YEAR SINGLE COPIES, 50 CENTS
Canadian Subscription Price is $3.50; Foreign, $4.00
Subscription price to individuals, not members of the Indiana State Bar Asso-
ciation, $3.00 a year; to those who are members of the association the price is$1.50, and is included in their annual dues, $7.00.
The complete management of the Indiana Law, Journal is exercised by
The Indiana State Bar Association through its officers. The Editor, Editorial
Boards and other officers of The Journal are appointed by the President of
The Indiana State Bar Association with the advice and approval of the
Board of Managers. The Indiana State Bar Association founded the Indiana
Law Journal and retains full responsibility and control of its publication.
The participation of Indiana University School of Law is editorial.
OFFICERS AND BOARD OF MANAGERS OF THE INDIANA
STATE BAR ASSOCIATION
ELI F. SEEBIRT, President ------------------------------- South Bend
WILMER T. Fox, Vice-President --------------------------- Jeffersonville
THOMAS C. BATCHELOR, Secretary-Treasurer --------------- Indianapolis
BOARD OF MANAGERS
1st District 7th District
John Gavit, Hammond T. Morton McDonald, Princeton
2nd District 8th District
Benjamin F. Long, Logansport Carl M. Grey, Petersburg
3rd District 9th District
Ira H. Church, Elkhart Estal G. Bielby, Lawrenceburg
4th District 10th District
James R. Newkirk, Fort Wayne George L. Tremain, Greensburg
5th District 11th District
Robert Van Atta, Marion Wade H. Free, Anderson
6th District 12th District
Chase Harding, Crawfordsville J. W. Fesler, Indianapolis
Member at Large-Frank H. Hatfield, Evansville
FowLER V. HARPER, Editor
THOMAS C. BATCHELOR, Business Manager
Faculty Board of Editors
Robert C. Brown Bernard C. Gavit
Milo J. Bowman James J. Robinson
Alfred Evans Hugh E. Willis
Student Board of Editors
CORBErT McCLELLAN, Chairnan
Alma A. Chattin Robert S. Oglebay
Max Klezmer Philip C. Richman
Sidney McClellan Samuel Sirois
Mary C. McNeely
The Indiana State Bar Association does not assume collective responsi-
bility for matter signed or unsigned in this issue.
